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Sumitomo Corp. P. Parakopi Compania Maritima:
United States Application of the Foreign
Arbitral Awards Convention to Disputes
Involving Only Foreign Entities
In 1958, representatives of forty-five United Nations member na-
tions developed the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards.' The Convention is an attempt "to encourage.
the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements.
in international contracts and to unify the standards by which agree-
ments to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced."' 2 The
courts of signatory states are required to recognize a written agreement
to arbitrate and to refer the parties in an action covered by such an
agreement to arbitration unless the agreement is found' null and void.
3
Signatory states must also recognize arbitral awards given in other states
as binding and enforce them in accordance with their own rules of proce-
dure. 4 Thus, the Convention responds to the two basic needs of those
using arbitration by providing a method for enforcing an agreement to
arbitrate and a method for enforcing arbitration awards.5 The Conven-
tion, however, does not provide for any specific means of enforcement;
therefore, much of its effectiveness is dependent upon the national courts
of the signatory states.6
In Sumztomo Corp. v. Parakopi Compania Maritima,7 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York became the first
U.S. court to deal directly with the question of the applicability of the
Convention to a case involving only foreign entities. The court held that
I June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective Dec. 29,
1970) [hereinafter cited as The Convention]. See Quigley, Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards,
58 A.B.A. J. 821 (1972).
2 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
3 The Convention, supra note I, art. II, § I. Article II, section I states that:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which
the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have
arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship,
whether contractural or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration.
4 Id. art. Il1. Article III states that "[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize arbitral
awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory
where the award is relied upon .
5
. Quigley, supra note 1, at 822.
6 Id.
7 477 F. Supp. 737'(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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the Convention, as adopted by the United States, gave federal district
courts jurisdiction over arbitration disputes where both parties were for-
eign8 and that principles of international comity did not require that it
stay arbitration in deference to litigation pending in another country
that arose out of the same dispute. 9
In 1975, Sumitomo, a Japanese corporation, and Parakopi, a Pana-
manian corporation with its principal place of business in Greece, en-
tered into a purchase agreement under which Sumitomo built and sold
to Parakopi a bulk carrier.' 0 The agreement contained a clause that all
nontechnical disputes were to be settled by arbitration in New York."
The purchase price of the vessel was fixed in terms of Japanese yen.12 In
1979, as a result of the sharp rise in value of the yen against the dollar,
Parakopi commenced an action in Greece to be relieved of its obligations
under the contract on the grounds of unforeseeable circumstances and
fraudulent concealment by Sumitomo of knowledge that the yen would
increase in value.' 3 Sumitomo served a demand for arbitration and, af-
ter Parakopi's refusal to appoint a third arbitrator, commenced this ac-
tion for an order to compel arbitration and for the appointment of a
third arbitrator.' 4
Parakopi presented four defenses to Sumitomo's petition. First,
Parakopi asserted that the parties had entered into a stipulation that pre-
cluded Sumitomo from taking any action to proceed to arbitration until
after a hearing in the action Parakopi had filed in Greece. 15 Second,
Parakopi alleged that Sumitomo's proper remedy was to seek a stay of
the suit in Greece from a Greek court. 16 Third, Parakopi asserted that
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because both Sumitomo and
Parakopi were foreign entities.' 7 Finally Parakopi argued that even if
the court did have jurisdiction, it should defer to the Greek litigation for
reasons of comity. 8
The court dispensed with Parakopi's first defense on the basis of its
factual finding that the stipulation by Sumitomo to submit to a hearing
in Greece was conditioned on the appointment by Parakopi of an arbi-
trator and selection of a third arbitrator.' 9 Because Parakopi had pre-
8 Id. at 741.
9 Id. at 742.
10 Id. at 738.
I d.







19 Id. at 740. In support of its holding the court quoted a telex from Sumitomo to its New
York counsel. Id. at n.5. This communication clearly suggested that Sumitomo's stipulation
was conditional:
WE HAVE . . . DECIDED TO ACCEPT [PARAKOPI'S] REQUEST FOR
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS CONVENTION
vented the second condition from being met by ordering its arbitrator to
refuse to select a third arbitrator, Sumitomo was not bound by the stipu-
lation.20
The second defense, that Sumitomo's proper remedy was to apply
for a stay from the Greek court, was premised on Parakopi's assertion
that Sumitomo did not have an arbitrable claim because Parakopi had
fully performed all of its contractual obligations. 2' The court noted that
this argument went to the merits of the dispute between the parties and
therefore was not a defense to the clause in the contract compelling the
parties to arbitrate disputes.2 2 The issue of whether Parakopi had fully
performed its contractual obligations was for the arbitrators to decide
and as such did not constitute grounds for dismissal of the petition to
compel arbitration. 23
The court's summary rejection of Parakopi's first two defenses left it
free to address the two more important issues in the case: whether the
court had subject matter jurisdiction and whether it should apply the
doctrine of comity. U.S. district courts have jurisdiction over actions
under the Convention as part of their jurisdiction over matters "aris[ing]
under the laws and treaties of the United States."'24 The only prerequi-
site to their jurisdiction over an action to compel arbitration, therefore, is
that the action be one "falling under the Convention" as adopted and
implemented by the United States. 25 The Convention permits states to
qualify their accession by limiting its application to only those "differ-
ences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractural or not,
which are considered as commercial under the national law" of the con-
tracting state.26 Because this limitation was adopted by the United
States as part of its accession to the Convention 27 and was incorporated
in section 202 of the federal legislation that implemented the Convert-
THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS SUB-
JECT TO THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
(A) [PARAKOPI] SHALL APPOINT ITS OWN ARBITRATOR ....
(B) THE THIRD ARBITRATOR SHALL BE APPOINTED PRIOR TO
THE EXTENDED COURT HEARING DATE.
IF THE PLAINTIFF DOES NOT CONSENT TO THE ABOVE CONDI-
TIONS, WE CAN NOT ACCEPT ITS REQUEST ABOVE MENTIONED.
Id. (brackets in original).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 741.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1976).
25 See id. This section also provides that the district courts have jurisdiction without re-
gard to the amount in controversy. Id.
26 The Convention, supra note 1, art. I, § 3.
27 Id. The United States declaration stated that:
The United States of America will apply the Convention, on the basis of
reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of only those awards made in the
territory of another Contracting State.
The United States of America will apply the Convention only to differences
arising out of legal relationships whether contractural or not, which are consid-
ered as commercial under the national law of the United States.
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tion,28 a determination as to whether an action falls under the Conven-
tion for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction often turns upon whether
that action can be considered to be one that is "commercial" under sec-
tion 202.29 This section, however, does not contain any definition of the
term "commercial."
Parakopi argued that the definition of "commerce" contained in
section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act of 192530 should be used as the
definition of "commercial" in section 202. 3 1 The Federal Arbitration Act
of 1925 constitutes Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act. The imple-
menting legislation for the Convention, including section 202, constitutes
Chapter 2 of this same Act. Because courts had previously found that
the definition of "commerce" contained in section 1 of the 1925 Act
made the 1925 Act inapplicable to disputes involving only foreign enti-
ties, 32 Parakopi argued that the definition of "commercial" in section 202
should be similarly construed to exclude disputes involving only foreign
entities from the scope of the Convention and, therefore, from the scope
of the court's jurisdiction over disputes falling under the Convention. 33
The court, however, found that the language of the two sections did
Although the United States took part in the development of the Convention in 1958, it did
not become a member at that time, largely because of a general distrust of arbitral agreements.
Quigley, supra note 1, at 821; accord, Note, United Nations Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention. United
States Accession, 2 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 67, 70 (1971). English courts traditionally had refused to
enforce irrevocable arbitration agreements because they considered them to be attempts to oust
thejurisdiction of the courts. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 5 10 n.4 (1974). This
view was adopted by American courts as part of the common law. Id. Changes in American
legal attitudes towards arbitration and pressure from private interest groups, including the
American Bar Association Committee on International Unification of Private Law and the
American Arbitration Association, finally resulted in United States accession to the Convention
in 1971. Note, supra, at 68, 70-72. The United States accession marked the first time that the
United States had become a party to a multilateral treaty dealing with arbitration, although it
had been a party to a number of bilateral treaties dealing with the subject. Id. at 67. The
Senate approved the United States accession by a vote of 57 to 0. 114 CONG. REc. 29,605
(1968).
28 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1976).
2 9 See id. § 202. Section 202 states that:
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relation-
ship, whether contractural or not, which is considered as commercial, . . . falls
under the Convention. An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship
which is entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall
under the Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad,
envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable rela-
tion with one or more foreign states. For purposes of this section a corporation is
a citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or has its principal place of
business in the United States.
30 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976). Section 1 states that:
"[Clommerce," as herein defined, means commerce among the several states or
with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of
Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such Ter-
ritory and any state or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and
any state or Territory or foreign nation. ...
31 477 F. Supp. at 740.
32 See, e.g.., The Volsinio, 32 F.2d 357, 358. (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
33 477 F: Supp. at 740.
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not support Parakopi's contention. 34 The two sections do not use pre-
cisely the same term: section 1 refers to "commerce" whereas the word
"commercial" is used in section 202.35 Further, the court found that sec-
tion 202 uses the term "commercial" in a "substantive" sense while sec-
tion 1 does not define "commerce" substantively, but only in
"geographical" terms. 36 Thus, the section 1 definition refers to "com-
merce among the several states or with foreign nations," but section 202
refers to "legal relationships" that can be considered to be commercial.
37
One section is concerned with the area and the parties involved, and the
other with the type of transaction. Section 202 does not make reference
to section 1, but rather to relationships considered commercial under the
national law of the United States.38 Because section 202 explicitly ex-
cludes purely domestic transactions from the coverage of the Convention,
it would seem that if Congress had also intended to exclude purely for-
eign transactions it would have explicitly done so.39
The court also noted that because section 1 is part of the 1925 Act,
which existed prior to the United States' accession to the Convention,
section 1 should apply to proceedings brought under section 202 of
Chapter 2 only to the extent that it does not conflict with the provisions
of Chapter 2 or the Convention. 40 The court reasoned that the policies
underlying the Convention and its adoption in the United States-en-
couragement of recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements
in international contracts and unification of the standards by which such
agreements are observed and enforced-were inconsistent with
Parakopi's interpretation of "commercial." '4' In support of its position,
the court noted that U.S. courts had applied the Convention to situations
iniolving only foreign entities previously, although they had not ad-




37 Compare 9 U.S.C. § I with 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).
38 477 F. Supp. at 740. See 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).
39 477 F. Supp. at 741.
- Id. See 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1976).' Section 208 states that "[cihapter I applies to actions
and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent that chapter is not in conflict with this
chapter or the Convention as ratified by the United States." Congress had originally planned to
amend Chapter I in order to implement the Convention, but concern that this would create
conflicts as to which sections would cover the Convention and which would be applied to the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 caused them to create a new Chapter 2 instead. Note, supra
note 27, at 73. See S. REP. No. 702, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970) (hearing before Committee on
Foreign Relations, Feb. 9, 1970) (statement of Richard D. Kearney, Chairman of the Secretary
of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law) [hereinafter cited as SENATE RE-
PORT].
41 477 F. Supp. at 741.
42 Id. See, e.g., Beromun Aktiengesellschaft v. Societa Industriale Agricola "Tresse," 471
F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (action to compel arbitration involving Liechtenstein corpora-
tion and Italian partnership); Ipitrade International, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F.
Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978) (action by Swiss corporation seeking enforcement of arbitral award
against Nigerian government); Ferrara S.p.A. v. United Grain Growers, Ltd., 441 F. Supp. 778
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cluded that arbitration disputes between foreign entities do fall under
the Convention and are within the subject matter jurisdiction of the fed-
eral district courts.
4 3
The Parakopi court is supported in its finding that "commercial" as
used in section 202 refers to the type of legal transaction involved in a
particular dispute by the fact that this is the sense in which it was used in
the Convention. The option to limit application of the Convention to
legal relationships considered commercial was originally placed in the
Convention to remove a barrier to accession by nations having separate
civil and commercial codes which allow arbitration only of matters fall-
ing within their commercial codes because, absent this reservation, the
Convention is applicable to all arbitrations, regardless of the legal nature
of the underlying dispute. 44 The United States adopted the reservation
in order to preserve the principle that primary jurisdiction over domestic
questions rests with the individual states.45 It also appears that those
American cases that have discussed the meaning of the term "commer-
cial" as it is used in section 202 have considered it to be a substantive
limitation on the kinds of international transactions that fall under the
Convention, rather than one placing limits on those who can be parties
to the action.
4 6
The legislative history of the implementing legislation, however, in-
dicates that the definition of "commerce" contained in section 1 proba-
bly was considered to be the national law definition of "commercial" for
purposes of the reservation. 47  A representative for the Department of
State, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
stated that "[i]t was not, of course, necessary to make any reference to the
national law of the United States in the first sentence of section 202 be-
(S.D.N.Y.), afd mem., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978) (action to compel arbitration involving
Canadian corporation and two Italian companies); Antco Shipping Co. v. Siderman S.p.A., 417
F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), a,4dmem., 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1977) (action to compel arbitra-
tion involving Italian shipowner and Bahamian corporation).
43 477 F. Supp. at 741.
44 McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards in the
UnitedStates, 2 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 735, 743 & n.37 (1971); accordQuigley, supra note 1, at 823.
45 Note, supra note 27, at 74. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 40, at 6 (statement of Rich-
ard D. Kearney, Chairman of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private Interna-
tional Law):
Paragraph I of article I of the Convention provides that the Convention
applies to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards without any limita-
tion as to the nature of the relationship that gave rise to the award. It might, for
example, be a question of family status ...
IT]he United States will file such a declaration because our purpose in ad-
hering to the Convention is for the beneficial effects it will produce for the foreign
commerce of the United States and not to make any changes with respect to
matters that are traditionally within the jurisdiction of the 50 States of the Union.
46 See, e.g., Island Territory of Curacoa v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1, 12-13
(D.C.N.Y.), aJf'd, 489 F.2d 1313, cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1973) (construction and leasing con-
tracts are "commercial"); Metropolitan World Tanker Corp. v. P.N. Pertambangan
Minjakdangas Bumi Nasional, 427 F. Supp. 2, 4 (D.C.N.Y. 1975) (a written provision in any
maritime transaction is "commercial").
47 McMahon, supra note 44, at 743-44.
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cause the definition of commerce contained in section 1 of the original
Arbitration Act [of 1925] is the national law definition for the purposes of
the declaration. '48 Those authorities writing about the Convention gen-
erally also assumed that this was to be the definition. 49 Nevertheless, use
of the section 1 definition is clearly inadequate. Under the terms of sec-
tion 1 an arbitration agreement or award between two foreign nationals
arising out of a transaction having no connection with the United States
would not fall within the definition of "commerce," and yet the whole
purpose of the Convention is to bind signatory nations to the recognition
and enforcement of such awards. 50 Where provisions of Chapter 1 are
inconsistent with the Convention, the Convention is controlling5' and,
therefore, this aspect of "commerce" as defined by section 1 would not be
relevant in deciding whether a transaction was "commercial" within the
meaning of section 202, even if the rest of the definition of commerce in
section 1 were controlling.
52
Further, if the restrictive definition of "commercial" suggested by
Parakopi were the correct one, there would have been little advantage in
the United States becoming a member of the Convention. The only time
that an arbitral dispute would fall under the Convention under that defi-
nition would be when the dispute was between an American citizen and
a foreign entity, and disputes of that nature already could be dealt with
under Chapter 1 of the Arbitration Act. 53 Thus, the Parakopi" court had
considerable support for its finding that application of the Convention to
disputes involving only foreign entities was necessary in order to further
the policies underlying the Convention and U.S. accession to it. 54
Parakopi's fourth argument was that the court should stay or dis-
miss the proceeding in deference to the pending litigation in Greece be-
cause of principles of international comity.55 In Hiton v. Guyot, 56 the first
and most famous American case to consider the relationship of comity to
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial acts, the United
48 SENATE REPORT, supra note 40, at 6 (statement of Richard D. Kearney, Chairman of
the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law).
49 See, e.g., Note, supra note 27, at 74-75:
There was no need to provide for a definition of foreign commerce in Section 202
because there is already a definition in Section 1 of the original Arbitration Act.
That definition refers both to interstate and foreign commerce. Therefore, Sec-
tion 202 only needed the limitation that the new legislation applied to foreign
[and not to domestic] commerce.
50 See McMahon, supra note 44, at 744.
51 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1976).
52 See McMahon, supra note 44, at 744.
53 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-21 (1974).
54 477 F. Supp. at 741.
55 Id.
56 159 U.S. 113 (1895). Hiton involved an attempt by a French company to enforce a
judgement obtained by it against an American in the French courts. The court found that,
because the French did not recognize foreign judgements as conclusive, there was a lack of
reciprocity which allowed the American courts to review the French judgement upon the merits
in a new trial. Id. at 227.
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States Supreme Court defined comity as "the recognition which one na-
tion allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts
of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and con-
venience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws."'57 From this definition, it is apparent
that the decision as to whether comity requires deference to a foreign
judgment involves a balancing of the policies for and against its applica-
tion. Absent fraud, U.S. courts have generally applied the doctrine of
comity where the foreign court is a court of competent jurisdiction 58 be-
cause comity is viewed as contributing to the promotion of justice and
better relations between nations. 59 A court need not apply the doctrine,
however, where it would be against public policy to do so.6°
The Parakopi court found that the doctrine of comity did not require
that it stay the proceeding to compel arbitration in favor of the litigation
pending in Greece. 6 1 In Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Services, Ltd,62 the
same federal district court, in an opinion written by Judge Werker, who
also authored Parakopi', found that comity was applicable to require dis-
missal in deference to a proceeding pending in a foreign court. 63 A com-
parison of Judge Werker's reasoning in these two cases illustrates the
policy factors that a court may consider significant in deciding whether
or not to apply the doctrine of comity.
Comfeld involved an indemnity action brought by a U.S. citizen
pursuant to an indemnification clause contained in a contract with a
Canadian corporation. 6 4 The Canadian corporation was already the
subject of liquidation proceedings in Canada and it moved to have the
action dismissed on the basis of international comity. 65 The court found
comity applicable for several reasons. The United States had tradition-
ally given comity to Canadian judgments because Canada, like the
57 Id. at 164.
58 Id. at 165. See Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Services, Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1255, 1259
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971).
59 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 165 (1895).
60 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117, Comment c (1971):
Judgements rendered in foreign nations are not entitled to the protection of full
faith and credit. A State of the United States is therefore free to refuse enforce-
ment to such a judgement on the ground that the original claim on which the
judgement is based is contrary to its public policy. A judgement rendered in a
foreign nation, however, will, if valid, usually be given the same effect as a sister
State judgement . . . .The fact that suit on the original claim could not have
been maintained in a State of the United States does not mean that a judgement
rendered on the claim in a foreign nation will necessarily be refused enforcement
by the courts of that State. In fact, enforcement will usually be accorded the
judgement except in situations where the original claim is repugnant to funda-
mental notions of what is decent and just in the state where enforcement is
sought.
61 477 F. Supp. at 742.
62 471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
63 Id. at 1260.
64 Id. at 1257.
65 Id.
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United States, is a common law jurisdiction. Therefore there was no
concern about the adequacy of procedural safeguards in the determina-
tion of the parties' rights. 66 More importantly, the liquidation proceed-
ing pending in Canada was extremely complex; it had been going on for
several years and had become transnational in scope.67 The court stated:
From a practical standpoint, recognition is a necessity if the liquidators
are to continue in their difficult task of recouping the assets of the fund
that may exist in countries all over the world, and their efforts to recover
the assets of a world-wide community of investors is manifestly 'consis-
tent' with the general policy of the United States. 68
The court also found that the public policy of the State of New
York, of the United States, and of Canada, as manifested in the Ameri-
can and Canadian bankruptcy laws, would be furthered by deference to
the Canadian proceeding. 69 Both the United States70 and Canadian 7'
bankruptcy laws provide for stay of actions after commencement of
bankruptcy proceedings, and the Revised Bankruptcy Act 72 of the
United States expressly implements principles of international comity.73
Applying comity would allow the assets of the bankrupt to be efficiently
and fairly distributed among creditors in a single proceeding, rather than
"erratically being dissipated in a number of different lawsuits."'7 4
In contrast to the complicated proceeding involved in Cornfdld, the
Parakopi court noted that all that had transpired in the Greek litigation
was the filing of a complaint. 75 Because the Greek court had not yet
reviewed the merits of the dispute, "compelling Parakopi to arbitration
at this juncture would not in any way waste or duplicate the efforts of the
Greek courts."
'76
The court also found that in the instant case the public policy of
New York, of the United States and of Greece would not be served by
applying the doctrine of comity because the public policy involved was
one strongly in favor of arbitration. 77 Both Greece and the United States
are signatories to the Convention and therefore have adopted its goal of
66 Id. at 1259.
67 Id. at 1258.
68 Id. at 1262 (quoting ITT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. 209, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
69 Id. at 1260.
70 See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § I1, 30 Stat. 549 (1898) (repealed 1979); FEI?. R.
BANKR. 401(a) (1976).
71 See Winding-Up Act, CAN. REV. STAT., C. W-10, § 21 (1970).
72 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 304(b), 304(c)(5), 305(a) (Supp. III 1980).
73 471 F. Supp. at 1260.
74 Id.
75 477 F. Supp. at 742.
76 Id.
77 Id. The strength of the United States policy in favor of arbitration is demonstrated by
the holding in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). In that case the United States
Supreme Court dismissed a proceeding in which the plaintiff claimed violations of section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1935 and Rule lOb-5 because the parties had agreed to arbi-
trate any controversies in accordance with the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce
in Paris. Id. at 521. Even the strong public policies behind Rule lOb-5 were not sufficient to
outweigh the importance of the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate:
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promoting international arbitration through recognition and enforce-
ment of arbitral agreements. 78 This goal would not be furthered in any
way by deferring to litigation in Greece that had been commenced partly
for the purpose of avoiding arbitration. 79 U.S. courts in interstate situa-
tions have repeatedly refused to allow a party to circumvent a valid arbi-
tration clause by commencing litigation in a state court because of the
disastrous effects that this would have on the utility of arbitration.80 The
Paracopi court reasoned that this policy is equally applicable to an inter-
national, situation.8
Parakopi points out a major gap in the legislation implementing U.S.
accession to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards-the lack of a definition of "commercial" as it is
used in section 202 of that legislation. The court in Parakopi filled that
gap to a certain extent by interpreting that term in a manner consistent
with the purposes and goals of the Convention. The failure of Congress
to define "commercial," however, adds uncertainty to the scope of the
Convention as adopted by the United States. This uncertainty works
against the purposes of arbitration and the Convention by permitting a
party who wishes to avoid arbitration to make enforcement expensive
and time-consuming by litigating the meaning of "commercial. 8 a2 Al-
though it is unlikely that other plaintiffs will make the argument that the
definition of "commercial" excludes disputes involving only foreign enti-
ties, it is very likely that they will make other arguments based on the
ambiguity in the meaning of that term. For instance, they may argue
that the particular transaction out of which their dispute arose should
not be considered to be one that is "commercial" within the meaning of
section 202.83
The Parakopi court's refusal to apply the doctrine of comity to defeat
arbitration is also consistent with the purposes and goals of the Conven-
tion. In order for the Convention to be effective, the signatory nations
must adopt policies that encourage parties to carry out their arbitration
An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a special-
ized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also
the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute. The invalidation of such an
agreement . . .would not only allow (a party] to repudiate its solemn promise,
but would, as well, reflect a "parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved
under our laws and in our courts. . . .We cannot have trade and commerce in
world markets and international waters exclusively on our own terms, governed
by our laws, and resolved in our courts."
Id. at 519 (quoting from The Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1971)).
78 477 F. Supp. at 742.
79 Id.
80 Id. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 400 F. Supp. 888, 890 (N.D.
Ill. 1975), afd, 541 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1975) (clear congressional purpose that when selected by
parties to a contract arbitration be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction by courts);
Burger Chef Systems, Inc. v. Baldwin, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1229, 1233-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (any
other procedure than stay or dismissal "would render arbitration agreements nugatory.").
81 477 F. Supp. at 742.
82 McMahon, supra note 44, at 744-45.
83 See id.
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agreements.8 4 Finding the doctrine of comity applicable in Parakopi
would have had the opposite effect. Such a holding would encourage
parties to an arbitration agreement to file suit in one country in order to
avoid enforcement of their agreement in another country. Therefore, as
the Parakopi decision suggests, the enforcement of arbitration agreements
must take precedence over concerns of international comity when the
two cannot be reconciled.
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84 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n. 15 (1974) (One concern of those
drafting the Convention was that "courts of signatory countries in which an agreement to arbi-
trate is sought to be enforced should not be permitted to decline enforcement of such agree-
ments on the basis of parochial views of their desirability or in a manner that would diminish
the mutually binding nature of the agreements.").

